One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and Its Political Consequences

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Intra-state regional differences are a central topic in the study of European and Eurasian politics. In Ukraine, regional differences have proven to be powerful predictors of mass attitudes and political behavior. But what does the "regional factor" in Ukrainian politics represent? Is it simply the result of compositional effects, or are the regional differences more than just a sum of other demographic factors correlated with geographic divisions? When analyzing regional divisions as an explanatory variable, what are the implications of employing different regional frameworks? In this article, we demonstrate how geographic divisions in the country hold up even when others factors—such as ethnicity and language use—are controlled for. As part of this inquiry, we compare the results of three competing regional frameworks for Ukraine: one with two regions, one with four regions and one with eight regions. While the eight-region framework is uncommon in studies of Ukraine, the decision to examine eight regions is supported by historical, economic and demographic arguments, as well as by the results of the statistical analyses presented in this article. Scholars who have focused on fewer regions in Ukraine may have underestimated the effects of regional differences and missed interesting stories about intra-state variation in Ukrainian attitudes and voting behavior. The results of this study carry important implications not only for the study of Ukraine but also for those interested in intra-state regional divisions across Europe and Eurasia.

It is taken as a truism by most scholars of post-Communist Europe that in Ukraine, more than in most countries, geography matters. The existence of powerful intra-state regional divisions in mass attitudes and political behavior (*e.g.* voting) in Ukraine has been a theme of numerous studies (Birch, 2000; Kubicek, 2000; Craumer and Clem, 1999; Barrington, 1997; Holdar, 1995). But what does it mean that there are strong regional differences in attitudes and behavior? Are the regional differences simply "compositional effects" (capturing other things that scholars claim are important in Ukraine such as language and ethnicity), or are they capturing underlying divisions that can be adequately disentangled from ethnicity and language and exert an independent effect? This question is a focus of our article. But we argue that it is not enough to demonstrate that regional divisions exist even when language and ethnicity are controlled for, as others have shown in Ukraine (Barrington, 2002; 2001; 1997; Birch, 2000; Wilson and Birch, 1999). Rather, the central question of

our article is how different regional frameworks affect analyses of Ukrainian mass attitudes and political behavior.

Although one might argue that the decision about how many regions to examine and which oblasts to include in which region is subjective (as evidenced by the large number of different regional arrangements examined by scholars of Ukraine), we demonstrate in this article that such a decision has consequences. As a result, scholars must carefully decide how best to delineate regions in Ukraine based on historical, economic and demographic features. Scholars must also take into account the concept of region as an intermediate geographic entity: regions must be large enough to justify the label "region" but not so large as to combine together significantly different areas in terms of history, economics and demographics; very small regions (with the region in question created from a single oblast, "autonomous region" or single city) and very large regions (half the country) must involve compelling cases for their treatment as "regions."

We divide the article into three sections. In the first section, we review the question of regionalism in Ukraine, specifically addressing a recent challenge to the importance of this cleavage. Next, we address political attitudes, with one section presenting results of the effects of views about the ethnic "other" and the subsequent section presenting findings about support for the government and political system. Lastly, we assess the role of region in parliamentary and presidential elections.

Regionalism in Ukraine

There is a debate over the way that geography intersects with political attitudes and behavior in Ukraine. Most scholars suggest that reasonably well-defined geographic divides exist. Others suggest that there is substantial intra- and inter-regional variation that we must account for. Indeed, we would expect that there is some bleeding along borders; the "regional factor" and its influence on political attitudes and behavior may not coincide perfectly with existing intra-Ukraine territorial borders. Yet, we also have reasons to believe that "region" may capture important differences among Ukrainians.

Do Regions Matter in Ukraine?

Few scholars of Ukraine would argue that regional divisions in the country are unimportant. But, O'Loughlin (2001) has made a case that the emphasis on regional divisions in the country is flawed. While O'Loughlin presents several arguments in his article questioning whether regional effects are "bogus," two claims in his critique are most damaging to the enterprise of studying regional effects in Ukraine: (1) apparent regional differences mask important variation within regions, and (2) the division of the country into regions creates artificially sharp internal boundaries that miss the "blurring" of regional divisions in Ukraine.[1]

His first point depends on the idea that any apparent regional effects are undermined if analysis of localities and other lower levels of geographic scale indicates significant variation within the larger geographic unit. As O'Loughlin (2001, p. 5) puts it, "Local and oblast-level patterns could show different trends and support contradictory hypotheses regarding the significance of the geographic effect in Ukraine." While the question of scale is a crucial one in geography (and a focus of our comparison of different regional approaches in this study), the idea that the existence of intra-regional variation weakens the argument for the existence of regional divisions is unconvincing. Within any group of respondents (separated from other respondents on the basis of regional, linguistic, gender or other differences), there will be variation.[2] O'Loughlin's point is only valid if there are compelling theoretical, historical and empirical reasons to consider very small geographic areas as the focus of the geographical analysis at the expense of the larger regions that scholars have traditionally examined. He offers no such compelling case.

In addition, if there is indeed too much internal variation and too little external variation among the regions, one would not expect to see a statistically significant regional effect (whether the intra-region variation was systematic or simply noise, too much of it would lead to a lack of statistical significance on regression coefficients). Numerous findings of statistically significant regional effects in the existing literature on Ukraine indicates, to the contrary, that something is going on at the regional level, even taking into account internal variation. While it is, therefore, important to keep in mind that not everyone in a certain region will think the same (just as not every member of a particular ethnic group or linguistic group will see eye to eye), this alone does not justify ignoring strong evidence of regional differences in Ukraine.

O'Loughlin's second argument is more compelling but, we contend, also ultimately flawed. It is quite reasonable to expect that the existing political-administrative borders upon which definitions of Ukrainian regions are based do not adequately delineate differences between regions. Scholars base their regional divisions on these boundaries, but the divisions researchers employ may not be organic and may inappropriately divide areas that have similar features that contribute to relatively cohesive political attitudes and behavior. Further, we would expect a ripple effect along natural regional borders and across borders with neighboring countries. Attitudinal or behavioral effects that emanate from one region may be difficult to distinguish from other regions as populations become more proximate to one another.

At the same time, analyses that examine geographic factors require lines to be drawn somewhere. After all, if we are to hold that attitudinal blurring around regional boundaries invalidates the use of region as an explanatory variable, multinational studies of survey data that control for the country of residence of the respondents must likewise be discarded. The blurring of attitudes between age

groups is also likely (with 59-year-olds having more in common with 60-year-olds than with 50-year-olds). Yet we do not dispense with the concept of age cohorts because of such attitudinal blurring. Thus, although we acknowledge the concerns about demarcating regional boundaries, we do not believe that such concerns outweigh the benefits of examining the extent to which regional differences in attitudes and behavior exist in Ukraine.

Strong Regional Differences or Compositional Effects?

Assuming one is satisfied that examining the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of regional differences is a worthy endeavor, the next step is to consider two contrasting ideas of what any apparent regional effects on political attitudes and behavior represent. Either they are compositional effects or they are representative of an underlying set of cohesive attitudes and behaviors that may in fact reflect differing regional political cultures. Testing for which of the two ideas of regional differences is more valid is rather easy, through analysis that controls for the various things that people would assume to be the compositional components. O'Loughlin (2001, p. 8) points out that in Ukraine these "compositional groups" include classes, religions, ethnic groups and urban populations, though one would certainly also want to control for language use as well as include other traditional demographic control variables such as gender and age in any analysis. While O'Loughlin (2001, p. 8) claims that "the unresolved question is whether the east–west divide remains visible when these factors are taken into account," studies previous to his (*e.g.* Birch, 2000; Barrington, 1997) have demonstrated the existence of regional effects even when controlling for possible compositional components. This article presents results that support the existence of strong regional divisions separate from any compositional effect.

Demonstrating that regional differences appear even when testing for compositional effects does not answer the question of why this is the case. We make two claims. First, the regional frameworks we examine can be justified in ways that are not easily captured by individual-level compositional variables (*e.g.* differing histories of foreign rule). Second, an extensive literature exists that highlights the importance of geographically based contextual factors in shaping attitudes and behavior (see, for example, Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993; Huckfeldt, 1974). This literature argues that living in a particular setting shapes attitudes over time. People who move from one region of the United States to another, for example, may see their attitudes change in line with the attitudes of those now around them. As Ulbig (1999, p. 1) puts it, "People learn from and adjust to the political and social contexts surrounding them." This means that even if compositional effects were initially behind the emergence of regional differences, regional attitudes can take on a life of their own over time, separate from their compositional foundation.

How Many Regions?

If controlling for possible composition effects reveals geographic differences, the question still remains: how many regions to include in analyses of attitudinal variation and political behavior? As we demonstrate in this article, different regional frameworks can produce different substantive findings. This is true not only about the effects of regional divides but also about the effects of other variables, once region is included in the investigation. In the statistical analyses below, we consider three competing regional breakdowns. The first is a two-region option, with the oblasts of Ukraine divided—as much as possible—between east and west by the Dniepr river. Such an approach has been used by many scholars, especially those focusing on electoral results.[3] The second regional arrangement we examine, even more popular with scholars, is a four-region variant—made up of west, central, south and east regions. This designation of oblasts into larger regions is based on Arel (1992). Finally, we consider an eight-region option for Ukraine given the country's economic development patterns, divergent historical experiences, and demographic features. Such characteristics of Ukraine support the idea that its oblasts cannot easily be combined into only two or even four regions.[4]

Because the eight-region framework is less common in studies of Ukraine than the two- or four-region approaches,[5] we will briefly present an argument for this arrangement prior to examining the consequences of choosing one framework over another. The basic justification for an eight-region approach is that two and four regions inadequately differentiate among areas with different historical, economic and demographic features. While the identification of eight regions may not perfectly divide Ukraine into areas with cohesive social and political identities, this approach is more likely to meaningfully cluster together geographic units.

The four-region framework (see Arel, 1992) places Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia in the east. We acknowledge that these oblasts are distinct from the rest of the country, but we also feel there are solid reasons to consider these oblasts as comprising two separate regions. In the eight-region approach examined in this study, therefore, two of these oblasts—Donetsk and Luhansk—form the "east" region.[6] They both border the Russian Federation. This area tends to be more industrial, urban[7] and Russified than other areas of the country, but also more Russified than Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia (Hesli, 1995). According to Arel (1992, 13), linguistic Russification has combined with the high percentage of ethnic Russians to create "solid majorities of Russophones" in Donetsk and Luhansk (68% and 64%, respectively).[8]

Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia provinces constitute the "east-central" region in the eight-region analyses.[9] Although they are heavily industrial and Russified, they are less demographically Russian than their neighbors to the east. Dnipropetrovsk is particularly worthy of note in this regard, since it is the second most industrialized oblast in Ukraine[10] but is the least Russified of the five oblasts

in the east and east-central regions. In addition, two of the three east-central oblasts—Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia—do not border Russia. Kharkiv does, although it is much less Russified than the oblasts to its east (Hesli, 1995).

The "north-central" region of the eight-region framework is an intriguing part of the country. Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts, along with the city of Kyiv, are included in this region.[11] The area did not come under Russian control until the middle 1600s to the late 1700s (Szporluk, 1997). The area is more industrial than much of the west but less so than the east (Hesli, 1995). With the exception of the city of Kyiv, the area also has lower population density and is less ethnically and linguistically Russian than the areas to its east (see Arel, 1995). Although Chernihiv and Sumy border Russia, they are much less urban, industrial and Russified than the east or east-central regions, and they share many demographic and historical features with the oblasts to their south.

The "southern" region of Ukraine in the eight-region analysis is composed of Kherson, Odesa and Mikolaiv provinces.[12] This area does not abut Russia (the Republic of Krym is treated as its own region; see below). Also, the Russians did not gain control of it until the late 1700s; much of it had been under Ottoman Turkish control (Szporluk, 1997; Arel, 1992). The area is also less urban, industrial and ethnically Russian than the east (see Hesli, 1995).[13]

The eight-region framework treats Krym (along with its city of Sevastopol, one of the two constitutionally designated cities of special significance in Ukraine) as a distinct region, which is uncommon in other scholarship.[14] There are good reasons to treat it as a separate region, especially as one considers whether the geographic differences in the country are capturing underlying regional cultures. Krym was the only part of Ukraine that did not strongly support independence in the 1991 referendum.[15] Russians comprise the majority of the region's population, nearly half of the Ukrainians there speak Russian as their first language (Solchanyk, 1994), and it was last area to formally join Ukraine (by act of the Soviet government, it was transferred from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] in 1954). By any standard, it is the least Ukrainian part of the country (see Barrington, 2002; Shaw, 1994).

The provinces of Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne and Volyn form the "west-central" region.[16] These oblasts were separated from both the central and western regions in the eight-region framework in part to gauge the extent to which there is a certain degree of regional "blurring" (Barrington, 2002) as one moves from the center of the country to the far west. But there are also solid historical, economic and demographic reasons for treating them as a distinct region. Unlike the oblasts to their south and west, these five oblasts fell under control of Russia as a result of the partitioning of Poland. Russia gained the territory that includes Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Khmelnytskyi during the second partition in 1793, and Rivne and Volyn with the third partition in 1795.[17] In addition, the oblasts of this region all have below average population densities, ones below those of the oblasts to their south and west.

In the eight-region framework, we also separate Chernivtsi and Zakarpatia—labeling it the "southwest"[18]—from the rest of the west region. These oblasts have low levels of industrialization, although interestingly rank at the bottom of the list of oblasts in terms of agricultural production as well (Hesli, 1995). They are both, however, above the average in oblast population density. More important, they both share long borders with neighboring countries (Slovakia, Hungary and Romania in the case of Zakarpatia, and Romania and Moldova in the case of Chernivtsi). Partly as a result of their location, and partly for historical reasons[19] the level of "Ukrainianness" in these oblasts is much lower than that of the oblasts to their north: Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk.

These remaining three oblasts make up the "west" region.[20] These three are often what scholars think of when they discuss the west of Ukraine. This region, what some call "Galicia" to this day, was part of the Polish territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (coming under the control of Austria as a result of the first partition of Poland in 1772) and controlled by independent Poland in the interwar period (Arel, 1992). The region is average to above average in population density. It is more ethnically Ukrainian than the oblasts to its south, and it was the heart of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism in the years preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Thus, we argue that there are strong historical, economic and demographic reasons to consider more regions than is the norm in studies of Ukraine. In Table 1, we present the three alternative regional arrangements that we examine statistically in the next several sections, with the oblasts (and Krym) and the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol (which are given special status in the Ukrainian Constitution) mapped into their respective regions.

Mass Attitudes: Regional Differences in Views about the "Ethnic Other," and about the Ukrainian Government and Political System

In the following sections, we analyze survey data about views of the "ethnic other" in Ukraine, support for the political system and support for the government. The survey data analyzed in this paper come from a late 1998 nationwide survey conducted in Ukraine.[21] The statistical analysis of these data support the notion that regional effects are not simply compositional effects, as well as highlighting the implications of employing differing regional frameworks.

Views of the Ethnic Other: Factors Affecting Individual-Level Variation

Ukraine is a country in which ethnic tensions were thought to be a serious *potential* problem, yet where serious ethnic conflict did not develop. It is, therefore, a useful case for those interested in ethnic conflict. While scholars remain concerned about inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine, particularly between ethnic Ukrainians and the

TABLE 1
Distribution of the oblasts, cities of special significance and the Krym
Republic into the three regional arrangements examined in this paper

Republic/oblast/city	2 divisions	4 divisions	8 divisions
Donetsk	East	East	East
Luhansk	East	East	East
Kharkiv	East	East	Eastcentral
Zaporizhzhia	East	East	East-central
Dnipropetrovsk	East	East	East-central
Krym (Crimea)	East	South	Krym
Sevastopol	East	South	Krym
Kherson	East	South	South
Mikolaiv	West	South	South
Odesa	West	South	South
Chernihiv	East	Central	North-central
Sumy	East	Central	North-central
Poltava	East	Central	North-central
Cherkasy	West	Central	North-central
Kirovohrad	West	Central	North-central
Kyivska Oblast	West	Central	North-central
Kyiv City	West	Central	North-central
Khmelnytskyi	West	Central	West-central
Zhytomyr	West	Central	West-central
Vinnytsia	West	Central	West-central
Rivne	West	West	West-central
Volyn	West	West	West-central
Ivano-Frankivsk	West	West	West
Lviv	West	West	West
Ternopil	West	West	West
Chernivtsi	West	West	Southwest
Zakarpatia	West	West	Southwest

country's large ethnic Russian population, a theme of some studies of Ukraine has been the "dogs that didn't bark" phenomenon—why did no significant ethnic conflict emerge in Ukraine (see, for example, D'Anieri, 1998; Dawson, 1997)? While these studies have considered a variety of explanations, they have not examined the degree of, and causal factors shaping, ethnic stereotypes in Ukraine. As a result, our understanding of ethnic relations in Ukraine is incomplete. In addition, the lack of such a study means that Ukraine has not been utilized in the way it can be—as a valuable case for developing a broader understanding of ethnic stereotyping in multi-ethnic states.

Aggregate level findings from the analysis of the survey data indicate that views of the ethnic other in Ukraine are generally positive, with Russians viewing Ukrainians a little more positively than Ukrainians view them. Yet, statistics such as

the mean score on a scale of stereotyping (see Barrington, 2001b) can tell us little about what shapes such attitudes at the individual level. Given that there is a noticeable variation in views of the ethnic other among the respondents, we focus on trying to understand the factors that influence such variation.[22]

Regional divides   There is a sense among scholars of stereotyping that how often in-groups and out-groups interact must be taken into account. Scholars disagree about whether "proximity" to the ethnic other will foster tolerance or resentment (see Burns and Gimpel, 2000; McAndrew *et al.*, 2000), but nearly all consider it to be an important factor.[23] One could think of several ways to capture the "geographic proximity" concept depending on the level one is most interested in, but—for reasons discussed earlier in the paper—regions make a great deal of sense in the case of Ukraine (see also Bremmer [1994] on ethnic stereotypes in Ukraine by regions). This is a point that was made strongly by participants in two focus groups conducted in 1999 in Ukraine as well (see Barrington and Herron, 2002). Existing studies such as Burns and Gimpel (2000) indicate that "border" areas may be more likely to hold negative views of minorities than other regions.

Before examining the effects of region through a comparison of different regional coding schemes in a multivariate estimation, it is necessary to consider the role of other basic, "demographic"[24] factors in shaping stereotypes in Ukraine. Many of these features are both common to statistical models explaining individual-level attitudinal variation and are discussed by scholars specifically interested in stereo-typical views of the "other." Much of the justification for the inclusion of these variables echoes the work of Burns and Gimpel (2000), who estimate models of racial stereotyping in the United States in the 1990s.

Ethnicity   Another logical factor to examine when considering demographic determinants of ethnic stereotyping is ethnicity itself. In a multi-ethnic state, one group may not be nearly as hostile toward a second group as that second group is to it. This is especially true in cases of a majority and large minority. In addition, a majority group may be the main ethnic other for a variety of ethnic groups, many of which may hold very different views about that majority. In Ukraine, the mean scores on a stereotyping scale constructed from the survey data and comments from the focus groups (see Barrington and Herron, 2002) indicate that Russians and Ukrainians do not see each other in equally positive lights.

But while the groups differed, they did not differ as much as one might have expected. In addition, such variation at the group level may not hold up at the individual level once other factors are controlled for. In Ukraine, ethnicity has not been "triggered" by elites to the extent that it has in other post-Soviet states (Barrington, 2002). Part of the reason for this is that ethnicity is not as simple to trigger in settings where the ethnic lines are blurred. Due to intermarriage (Rapawy, 1997; Pirie, 1996) and language use (see below), Ukraine could be seen as a case of

ethnic blurring (see also Smith and Wilson, 1997). As Ponarin (2000, p. 1535) puts it, "Even though the boundaries between Western Ukrainians and Russians may seem as strong as those between Russians and Estonians, the boundaries between the various Ukrainian groups in actual contact are quite fluid." Analysis of survey data in Bremmer (1994) points to this blurring, since conspicuous numbers of respondents in Simferopol and, to a lesser extent, Kyiv were unable to identify the ethnic make-up of their neighborhoods. This was not the case in Lviv.

Language   One reason for the perception of a "fluid" or "blurred" nature of ethnicity in Ukraine is that linguistic and ethnic lines are not complementary. Specifically, the existence of large numbers of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the country cuts into the ethnic divisions.[25] This has led scholars to claim that language is, in fact, the main "fault line" in Ukraine (Arel, 1998) and that Russian-speaking Ukrainians may think more like Russians than like their Ukrainian-speaking co-ethnics (Craumer and Clem, 1999). Supporters of this view feel that if one speaks the same language as the ethnic other, it is likely that one would view members of that ethnic group more favorably (see also Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001).

   But while the language fault line idea makes sense, several studies call into question its importance. Bremmer (1994) points out that even in areas where Ukrainians are not generally fluent in Ukrainian, they often claim to be, showing a sense of attachment to their "own" culture and a desire to express this attachment. In addition, the language variable has not always held up in statistical analyses of Ukrainian mass attitudes which include both ethnic and regional controls (see Barrington, 2002; 2001a; 1997).

Urban/rural divisions   The percentage of Russians also varies greatly based on size of locality in Ukraine. The large oblast capital cities have significantly more Russians than smaller towns around them, and these differences have been associated with individual-level differences in post-Soviet political attitudes (Craumer and Clem, 1999; Melvin, 1995). This is consistent with the preliminary discussion in Burns and Gimpel (2000), as well as the results of their study which indicate that urban residents, other things constant, are more favorable in their views of other ethnic groups. Thus, one might also expect to find variation in stereotypes as the result of differences in size of locality in Ukraine, and, as a result, locality size is also included in the model estimated below.

Religious beliefs   Like language, religion is a variable that cross-cuts ethnic identity in Ukraine. Not only are there differences within ethnic groups between believers and non-believers, but believers among ethnic Ukrainians differ in terms of denomination (Gee, 1995). Especially in the far west of the country, there is a large Ukrainian Uniate population, while most Ukrainian believers in the rest of the country would associate themselves with the Ukrainian Orthodox or Russian

Orthodox Church (see Bremmer [1994] for statistics on denomination differences in Lviv, Kyiv and Simferopol). In addition, while religion may not serve as an ethnic marker in Ukraine to the extent that it does in other countries, those who are religious believers might be expected to be less favorable in their views of the ethnic other. Particularly for Uniate believers in the west of the country, religious belief may be associated with a strong sense of difference from the ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

Education, gender and age   Education is a commonly employed variable in models of attitudinal variation, especially in post-Soviet studies (for one of the more recent of numerous examples, see Poppe and Hangendoorn, 2001). It is especially reason-able in models reflecting views of groups different from one's own, since education is associated with greater tolerance of out-groups (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). In their study, Burns and Gimpel (2000, see Table 1) find statistically significant relation-ships between education level and negative stereotyping tendencies.

While women are traditionally thought of as more tolerant than men, studies in various settings have shown that women tend to be more conservative and supportive of "traditional values" (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). In addition, studies of survey data from several post-Soviet states have found statistically significant differences be-tween male and female respondents on a host of attitudinal dependent variables (see, for example, Miller *et al.*, 1997; Dowley *et al.*, 1996).

Another variable often discussed as a demographic determinant of attitudes is age. In the context of this study, age may affect stereotyping due to differences in conditions and socialization processes at the point in time when different cohorts came of age. Because stereotypes are likely to be sticky, generational effects may be strong. Such expectations are consistent with previous studies of attitudes in the post-Soviet states (Birch, 1998; Hesli and Miller, 1993), as well as the findings in Burns and Gimpel (2000) on racial stereotypes.

Personal economic situation   One would also expect one's economic well-being at the present to be a demographic determinant of ethnic stereotyping. Measures of economic well-being, such as income, are common variables in studies of post-So-viet attitudes (see, for example, Poppe and Hagendoorn, 2001; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Hesli and Miller, 1993). In the OLS models examined below, we include a set of dummy variables that reflect the current economic standing of the survey respondents. Following the argument of Burns and Gimpel (2000), we expect higher levels of personal economic well-being to be associated with more positive views of the ethnic other.

Comparing Statistical Models of Views of the Ethnic Other

Three OLS models were estimated, with the stereotype scale serving as the depen-dent variable. The coefficients for the demographic variables for region, nationality, language, religious believer, size of locality, sex of the respondent, level of

education, and economic standing were estimated through the use of dummy variables, with one dummy term for each variable left out of the equation to serve as the comparison group (*e.g.* ethnic Ukrainians in the case of nationality, female in the case of sex of the respondent). The results of the statistical analyses of the three models of stereotyping of the ethnic other are presented in Table 2.[26]

One of the most striking features of Table 2 is the absence of statistical significance at the 0.05 level for the vast majority of the demographic variables. Other than the regional dummy variable terms, only the Russian nationality dummy variable term (showing that the different stereotyping tendencies between Ukrainians and Russians hold up even when other factors are controlled for) and the very low economic standing dummy variable term were statistically significant; they were statistically significant across the three models. Thus, for this particular question, using a different regional approach does not lead to different substantive conclusion about the non-regional variables.

The pattern of statistical significance for the regional variables, however, is interesting, and may tell us a lot about the benefits of considering more regions than has been the norm in the existing literature on Ukraine. Regional differences are distinct no matter how much one combines smaller regions into larger ones; the differences between the west and the rest was strong in both the two-region and four-region models. But, the results of the four-region and eight-region models indicate that some of the story of how different the various regions of Ukraine are from the west of the country can be obscured by employing the "super-region" approach of only looking at east and west.

In the four-region model, the west did not differ as much from the central region as it did from the east and from the south (the excluded comparison term for the four-region model).[27] In the eight-region model, the regional differences are more complex. In comparison to the excluded region (again, the south), several regions— Krym, the east, the east-central and the southwest—do not demonstrate statistically significant differences. This latter region's similarity with the south (and dissimilarity with the west) is important to highlight, since it is typically included in the west in four-region frameworks. The differences between the north-central and west-central regions and the south are statistically significant. Their negative coefficients indicate that residents of these regions view the ethnic-other group less favorably than respondents from the south. The west region showed the greatest difference—and least favorable views of the ethnic other—perhaps not surprising given the common portrayal of the three oblasts comprising the west (Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk) as the heart of anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine.

Comparing Models of Views of the Political System and Government

In this section, we present the results of two additional sets of statistical estimations. In the first set of three model estimations, the dependent variable is support for the

TABLE 2

OLS estimates of the effects of various demographic determinants of ethnic stereotypes in Ukraine

Dependent variable:
Scale of stereotypes of the ethnic other.
Positive scores = positive views of the other.
Min. = −5.00; max. = 5.00; mean = 1.99.

Region	Two-region model	Four-region model	Eight-region model
Independent variable: Coeff. Est.			
East (2)	0.710**		
East (4)	—	0.047	—
Central (4)	—	− 0.482*	—
West (4)	—	− 1.197**	—
Krym (8)	—	—	− 0.322
East (8)	—	—	0.062
East-central (8)	—	—	− 0.171
North-central (8)	—	—	− 0.556*
West-central (8)	—	—	− 0.815*
Southwest (8)	—	—	− 0.714
West (8)	—	—	− 1.818**
Other variables			
Ethnic Russian	0.586**	0.627**	0.692**
Other ethnic	0.242	0.320	0.254
Russian speaker	0.242	0.031	− 0.082
Mixed speaker	0.279	0.190	0.100
Religious believer	− 0.162	− 0.045	− 0.045
Very large city	0.274	0.162	0.187
Large city	− 0.372	− 0.283	− 0.297
Medium city	0.341	0.320	0.312
Small city	− 0.281	− 0.212	− 0.276
Age	− 0.000	− 0.000	− 0.000
Male	− 0.259	− 0.220	− 0.225
Lower education	0.305	0.266	0.252
Completed secondary education	0.355	0.316	0.317
Some higher education	− 0.239	− 0.239	− 0.152
Low economic standard	0.126	0.196	0.195
Very low econonmic standard	0.604*	0.576*	0.546*
Constant	0.944**	1.709**	1.863**
Adjusted R^2	0.065	0.068	0.074
SE	2.551	2.547	2.538

*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01.

political system (regime) of the country. The other set of three models estimates the effects of particular independent variables on support for the government itself rather than the political system. In both sets of models, the demographic variables examined are the same as those for the stereotypes equations (for a discussion of the inclusion of these variables in estimations of models of support for government and regime, see Barrington, 2002).

The results of the estimations of the models of support for the regime are presented in Table 3. Again, even a casual glance at Table 3 would make apparent the weakness in statistical significance of the majority of the demographic variable coefficient estimates. This is less true than in the case of the models of ethnic stereotyping, however. Low education level, low economic standing and very low economic standing are significant across all three models.

Examining the results across the three models also highlights, more than in the first set of models, the consequences of regional framework choice on the non-regional variables. The two language dummy variable terms in the models, Russian speaker and mixed speaker, were statistically significant in the two-region and eight-region models but not in the four-region model. Thus, those employing the four-region approach would conclude that language is not a statistically significant factor in regime support. On the other hand, those using the two-region framework would see religious believer status as statistically significant, while it is not in the four-region and eight-region models.

The statistical significance for the regional variables[28] is strong across all three models. In addition, even more clearly than in Table 2, the results in Table 3 show interesting regional patterns in the eight-region model lost in the analysis of fewer and larger regions. Three of the regions (the east, the north-central and the west-central) are not statistically significant from the excluded comparison region (the south). This alone is intriguing, since these are clearly not regions that scholars would tend to lump together in analyses employing a fewer number of larger regions. Two of the regions, the east-central and Krym, are much less supportive of the Ukrainian political system than the south. In both cases, a respondent from these regions would score over eight points lower on the regime support scale than a respondent from the south. Although this may not surprise scholars of Ukraine, it is important to point out that these results would have been overlooked or misinterpreted by scholars assessing the four-region model estimation. Krym is generally included in the south, and therefore its great difference from the oblasts of the south would have been missed. The four-region model also misses the fact that the (eight-region framework's) east-central oblasts are driving much of the apparent difference between the south and the east. Finally, it is worthy of note that while both the west and the southwest regions are significantly more supportive of the political system than the south in the eight-region model, the coefficient on the southwest region dummy variable term was nearly twice as large as that of the west. Thus, although the four-region approach would already make one question the idea of Ukrainian regional differences as

TABLE 3
OLS estimates of the effects of various demographic determinants of regime support in Ukraine

Dependent variable:
Scale of support for the regime.
Positive scores = support for the political system.
Min. = − 40.00; max. = 30.00; mean = − 19.89.

Region	Two-region model	Four-region model	Eight-region model
Independent variable: Coeff. Est.			
East (2)	− 4.087**		
East (4)		− 3.186*	
Central (4)		0.823	
West (4)		7.931**	
Krym (8)			− 8.257**
East (8)			− 2.851
East-central (8)			− 8.346**
North-central (8)			− 1.857
West-central (8)			− 3.312
Southwest (8)			8.125**
West (8)			4.630*
Other variables			
Ethnic Russian	− 0.646	− 0.982	− 0.116
Other ethnic	− 1.502	− 2.177	− 2.989
Russian speaker	− 4.553**	− 2.258	− 3.308*
Mixed speaker	− 2.816*	− 1.421	− 2.686*
Religious believer	1.935*	0.899	1.180
Very large city	0.554	1.857	1.109
Large city	− 1.081	− 1.767	− 1.317
Medium city	0.886	1.572	0.377
Small city	2.201	2.258	2.079
Age	− 0.022	− 0.020	− 0.021
Male	− 0.133	− 0.379	− 0.114
Lower education	3.023*	3.271*	2.664**
Completed secondary education	− 0.119	0.133	− 0.337
Some higher education	0.426	0.291	0.034
Low economic standard	− 4.034**	− 4.271**	− 4.249**
Very low economic standard	− 8.751**	− 7.697**	− 7.535**
Constant	− 10.299**	− 14.528**	− 10.440**
Adjusted R^2	0.101	0.126	0.148
SE	14.472	14.271	14.10081

*$p \leq 0.05$; **$p \leq 0.01$.

simply the "west versus the rest" (see Holdar, 1995; Craumer and Clem, 1999), the eight-region framework demonstrates this even more effectively.[29]

Table 4 contains the coefficient estimates and other statistics from the estimation of the three models of support for the government. The pattern of statistically significant coefficients is somewhat similar to those in Table 3, though a few more variables were significant at the 0.05 level. This time, residents of large cities were statistically significant in their difference from village residents across all three models, with those in large cities noticeably less supportive of the government than villagers. Likewise, age was significant in all three models, older residents being more supportive than younger ones.[30]

The coefficient estimates for the language, nationality and religious believer dummy variable terms, however, differed noticeably across the three models. While the Russian nationality coefficient was statistically significant in the first two models, it lacked such significance in the eight-region model. On the other hand, the other ethnic group term (non-Russian, non-Ukrainian) lacked statistical significance in the first estimation but was significant in the second two models. Thus, a researcher interested in the extent to which ethnic identity was related to government support in Ukraine would reach three different conclusions depending on which regional framework was used. The two-region framework suggests that ethnic Russians show less support than ethnic Ukrainians (the excluded comparison group), while other ethnic groups cannot be statistically distinguished from ethnic Ukrainians. Employing a four-region model, the same researcher would conclude that both of the non-Ukrainian groups were distinguishable from Ukrainians, and conspicuously less supportive of the government. Choosing the eight-region approach, this researcher would not be able to conclude that ethnic Russians were less supportive than ethnic Ukrainians but would reach this conclusion about the other ethnic groups in the sample. The mixed language use variable coefficient was significant at the 0.05 level in the first model and the third model, but it was not in the four-region model estimation. The religious believer variable was significant in the two-region model but not in either of the other two.

Thus, utilizing different regional frameworks has implications for our understanding of the effects of the non-regional variables on government support. It also has great consequences for understanding the role of region. The regional variable terms were generally highly statistically significant across the three models.[31] But there were telling exceptions, with important implications for understanding the "regional divide" in Ukraine, along with notable differences in the sign and magnitude of the statistically significant coefficients. The two-region model supports the view of Ukraine as essentially divided between the east and west, with the east less supportive of the government than the west. The four region model, however, indicates that the while the east and west are quite different from another (much more than the two-region model implies), the central part of the country and the south are statistically indistinguishable from one another and

TABLE 4

OLS estimates of the effects of various demographic determinants of government support in Ukraine

Dependent Variable:
Scale of support for the government.
Positive scores = support for the government.
Min. = −40.00; max. = 40.00; mean = −18.66.

Region	Two-region model	Four-region model	Eight-region model
Independent variable: Coeff. Est.			
East (2)	−3.175**	—	—
East (4)		−5.035**	—
Central (4)		−2.536	—
West (4)		6.576**	—
Krym (8)			−9.297**
East (8)			−6.355**
East-central (8)			−9.304**
North-central (8)			−5.966**
West-central (8)			−6.406**
Southwest (8)			12.009**
West (8)			2.217
Other variables			
Ethnic Russian	−2.504*	−2.908*	−1.992
Other ethnic	−4.280	−4.973*	−6.513**
Russian speaker	−5.549**	−3.413*	−4.423**
Mixed speaker	−3.173*	−1.657	−2.965*
Religious Believer	2.768*	1.632	1.777
Very large city	0.562	0.891	0.454
Large city	−3.222*	−3.732**	−2.941*
Medium city	−1.430	−0.428	−1.435
Small city	1.758	2.196	2.279
Age	0.055*	0.057*	0.059*
Male	0.092	−0.009	0.243
Lower education	2.298	2.390	1.832
Completed secondary education	0.634	0.767	0.324
Some higher education	−0.880	−1.092	−1.259
Low economic standard	−4.106*	−4.175*	−3.894*
Very low economic standard	−10.802**	−9.106**	−8.569**
Constant	−10.965**	−13.116**	−9.331**
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.139	0.165
SE	17.099	16.808	16.548

*$p \leq 0.05$; **$p \leq 0.01$.

fall in-between the west and the east in terms of their attitudes toward the government.

It is the eight-region model, however, that paints a much more nuanced (and we argue much more interesting) picture about regional divisions in Ukraine. Krym and the east-central region are the regions least supportive of the government. The large, negative coefficients indicate a great deal of resentment; other things constant, a survey respondent from the east-central region would score more than nine points lower than a respondent from the south on the -40 to 40 government support scale. Interestingly, and a strong challenge to the "east versus west" portrayal of Ukraine, the east, north-central and west-central regions had similar coefficients to one another, indicating less support in these regions compared with the south (though more than in the east-central and Krym regions). Perhaps most surprising are the coefficients for the west and southwest regions. The west region coefficient is positive, but it lacks statistical significance. Thus, we are unable to conclude that respondents in the west differ significantly from the respondents in the comparison region of the south. The coefficient for the southwest variable, however, is very large and statistically significant. This finding is highly instructive, since it indicates that studies that included this region in a larger west region have likely generated misleading findings about the west compared with the rest of the country. On this question, the west of Ukraine is not an "outlier" as some have claimed; it is not even all that different from the south. The true outlier appears to be the southwest of the country.

Political Behavior: Regional Differences in National Elections

Not only have regional differences been posited as an explanatory factor to account for variation in Ukrainian political attitudes, but conventional wisdom and formal scholarship suggest that political behavior varies from region to region as well. Research on election turnout and outcomes has underscored the regional effect, usually focusing on differences between east and west. President Leonid Kuchma's victory in 1994 has been attributed to his courting of the east through a focus on state involvement in the economy, enhancing Ukraine's ties with Russia and defending the interests of Russian-speakers (Birch, 1995; Kubicek, 2000; Wilson, 2000). By contrast, Kuchma's later win in 1999 was engineered in part by his adoption of a platform popular in the west—Ukrainian national interests and the market (Birch, 2002).

Studies of parliamentary elections have also emphasized the role of regions as explanatory variables for party support. Regional affiliation has been noted by scholars studying the 1998 parliamentary race as a causal factor operating independently from language, ethnicity and religion. But, the strength, direction and consistency of the regional effect varies among parties; region appears to better explain vote outcomes for parties of the left and right than for those of the center (Wilson and

Birch, 1999; Birch, 2000). Parties of the left derive much of their support in eastern regions that are historically industrial and geographically proximate to Russia. Parties of the right and center-right are more successful in western regions that have historic ties with Europe. Regional support varies for parties of the center (Craumer and Clem, 1999; Wilson and Birch, 1999; Birch, 2000; Kubicek, 2000).

Why might we expect a regional effect to manifest itself in elections? Voters in any region will not monolithically vote for a single party or candidate. But voters in a region may display reasonably cohesive support for specific candidates or parties because of underlying policy preferences or regional connections. Differences in policy, particularly regarding state involvement in the economy and relations with Russia, may explain some differences in support related to region. Voters in regions that traditionally rely on heavy industry (*i.e.* Donbas) should be more likely to support candidates and parties who advocate state subsidies for failing industries. By contrast, voters in agricultural areas should be more likely to reject parties advocating diversion of state funds to support industry in other areas of the country. Further, regions that are geographically proximate to Russia or maintain strong cross-border trade with Russia should be more likely to contain residents who support the maintenance of good relations with Russia. Voters in regions more distant from Russia may be more interested in developing commercial and political relations with other states. Moreover, residents of regions that were incorporated later into the USSR may be more suspicious of Russian government involvement in Ukrainian political and economic life.

Some candidates or parties may also derive support based on their origins. Many parties in Ukraine have strong regional networks and maintain support from certain regions (D'Anieri *et al.*, 1999). Further, candidates or parties with local patronage connections may derive support due to their perceived ability to deliver pork barrel benefits to the region (or to regional elites). Thus, it is not surprising that Leonid Kuchma, a long-time resident of Dnipropetrovsk and former factory manager, was relatively successful in that oblast in the 1999 presidential race.

The basic questions for this section are the following: Do we find evidence of regional effects in parliamentary and presidential election results when we control for other factors influencing outcomes? If so, how do different regional definitions affect our interpretations of election outcomes? The unit of analysis is geographic: the 225 districts that make up the 27 administrative units of Ukraine. Our analysis of the 1998 parliamentary and 1999 presidential elections does not directly address individual voter behavior, but rather tendencies at the district level.

1998 Parliamentary Elections

Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections were conducted using a non-compensatory mixed electoral system with half of the seats allocated through proportional representation (PR) with a 4% threshold and half allocated through single-member district

seats (SMD) with a plurality formula. Thirty parties competed in the party list component and additional parties nominated candidates in the district races. We restrict our analysis to two parties that have been the primary subjects of other analyses: the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) and People's Rukh.

In our analysis, the dependent variable is the party's performance in the PR vote at the local level, measured as a percentage. The first independent variable, SMD, assesses the placement of candidates in the corresponding district race. We assume that placing a candidate in a local race should have a positive effect on PR outcomes through an "advertising effect" from the local SMD candidate's campaign and a "ballot effect" from a candidate's association with a party on the ballot paper.[32] The second independent variable assesses incumbency. Incumbents in SMD races should benefit their affiliated parties more than new candidates, since they should be better able to attract voters to the party.[33]

Two sets of geographic variables represent regional effects. We include dummy variables for the two-, four- and eight-region approaches. In addition, we include interactive terms for region and SMD placement. The latter set of regional variables measures the conditional effect of running a candidate in SMD in a specific region of Ukraine on PR outcomes. If the interactive term's coefficient is significant, it suggests that the influence of region may be complex; electoral effects may be attenuated by regional factors.

Table 5 shows OLS results for KPU performance with Ukraine divided into two, four and eight regions.[34] The coefficient for candidate placement is statistically significant for two and eight regions. It is significant at the 0.10 level with Ukraine divided into four regions.[35] The parameter estimate for incumbency is statistically significant under all three regional divisions and its effect is in the same direction and of similar magnitude. In the two-region model, the coefficient for the east region is statistically significant and positive in sign; the KPU performs better in the district-level PR vote in eastern oblasts. This outcome is expected and could end the discussion. Yet, probing KPU performance by creating smaller regions provides additional insights. In the four-region model, the regional effect is most prominent in the central and western regions. The KPU's performance in the east is not statistically different from the excluded category (south). It receives, on average, 11% fewer votes at the district level in the central region and 23% fewer votes in the west. The simple east–west divide in the two regions model hides important variation in support.

The eight-region model provides additional information.[36] Consistent with expectations, the KPU performs well in the east relative to other regions. Coefficients for the west and west-central regions show that the KPU faces greater handicaps in Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Ternopil than in Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Rivne and Volyn. While its performance is substantively worse than in the reference category in both regions, the KPU receives, on average, 20% fewer votes in the west and 13% fewer votes in the west-central region.

TABLE 5
KPU performance in 1998 (OLS estimates with robust standard errors)

	2 regions	4 regions	8 regions
Constant	12.366**	29.144**	24.679**
SMD	5.883**	5.568	9.014*
INC	7.835**	5.911**	4.347**
East	14.843**		
East*SMD	− 1.380		
Central		− 10.777**	
East		− 1.899	
West		− 23.219**	
Central*SMD		− 1.468	
East*SMD		0.405	
West*SMD		− 4.188	
East			14.458**
East-central			− 1.879
Krym			5.607
North-central			− 6.006
Southwest			− 7.405
West			− 20.293**
West-central			− 12.627**
East*SMD			− 12.321**
East-central*SMD			0.060
Krym*SMD			—
North-central*SMD			− 5.959
Southwest*SMD			− 16.137
West*SMD			− 10.287*
West-central*SMD			− 0.431
Adjusted R^2	0.460	0.660	0.690
MSE	9.99	8.00	7.77
N	225	225	225

Note: West is the excluded region for the two-region model. South is the excluded region for the four- and eight-region models.
**$p \leq 0.01$; *$p \leq 0.05$.

The interaction between electoral and regional factors is also instructive.[37] The effect of the interactive variable must be treated with care, since it represents a conditional relationship. Rather than looking solely at the interactive coefficient, it is best to compare the predicted outcome of the dependent variable using hypothetical scenarios. We would expect the KPU to receive, on average, 4% of the vote in the west. If it places a candidate in the SMD race, we would expect it to receive 3% if the candidate is not an incumbent, 7% if the candidate is an incumbent. There is a similar effect in the east—the KPU performs better in the region, but SMD

TABLE 6
Rukh performance in 1998 (OLS estimates with robust standare errors)

	2 regions	4 regions	8 regions
Constant	10.146**	5.726**	4.366**
SMD	2.600	− 0.612	0.759
INC	12.402**	6.297**	6.735**
East	− 7.439**		
East*SMD	− 0.959		
Central		− 1.481	
East		− 3.581**	
West		18.530**	
Central*SMD		4.267**	
East*SMD		1.962	
West*SMD		− 0.817	
East			− 2.461**
East-central			− 1.106
Krym			0.891
North-central			− 0.496
Southwest			4.904*
West			23.365**
West-central			3.871
East*SMD			− 0.265
East-central*SMD			0.085
Krym*SMD			− 0.014
North-central*SMD			3.013**
Southwest*SMD			—
West*SMD			− 0.142
West-central*SMD			3.977
Adjusted R^2	0.380	0.716	0.761
MSE	7.31	4.99	4.66
N	225	225	225

Note: West is the excluded region for the two-region model. South is the excluded region for the four- and eight-region models.
**$p \leq 0.01$; *$p \leq 0.05$.

placement outweighs the regional effect only when the candidate is an incumbent.[38] Region exerts both an independent direct effect and an indirect effect (through candidate placement) on PR performance.

Results for Rukh are presented in Table 6. Just as the KPU results show both direct and indirect effects of region, so too do the Rukh results.[39] While candidate placement does not affect PR performance directly, regional variation in Rukh performance is evident.[40] In the two-region model, Rukh receives, on average, 7%

fewer votes in the east than in the west. When Ukraine is divided into four regions, intra-regional variation becomes clearer: not surprisingly, Rukh performs particularly well in the west. Moreover, we find a significant interactive effect between candidate placement and geography in the central region. While Rukh performance in the central region is not statistically different from its performance in the south, it receives an additional 4% in central districts where it fields a candidate in SMD. In the eight-region model, Rukh performs well in the west and southwest.[41] Further, the interaction between candidate nomination and region is significant in the north-central region, indicating that Rukh especially benefits from SMD candidate placement there.

Results from the 1998 parliamentary elections suggest that region exerts important direct and indirect effects on party performance in the PR component of the election. Using models with fewer regions hides interesting variation in regional effects across Ukraine.

1999 Presidential Elections

While the parliamentary election results provide some evidence that region may have an independent effect on voting behavior and election outcomes, O'Loughlin (2001), as noted above, suggests that the regional effect is bogus. His analysis of elections focuses on the turnout of Kuchma supporters in the second round of the 1999 presidential contest. He argues that not only did Kuchma receive more votes than the KPU challenger Petro Symonenko, but this occurred largely because Kuchma supporters were more likely to come to the polls. Further, O'Loughlin suggests that Kuchma won because of his ability to mobilize support in the west, Kyiv and to a lesser degree Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk (2001, p. 18).[42]

But, the use of only second-round data and turnout as the primary variable of interest unnecessarily restricts the analysis. Ukraine's presidents are elected by a majority-runoff system. To win on the first ballot, a candidate must receive 50% + 1 of the vote. If no candidate achieves this in the first round, a runoff is held between the top two candidates. This system encourages many candidates to participate in the first round (Jones, 1999) and as a consequence tends to provide voters with a wide range of choices. O'Loughlin (2001, p. 12) asserts that "[b]ecause the runoff dispensed with any confusion generated by multiple candidates, the aggregate statistics [in the second round] are more representative of voter preferences and Ukrainian electoral divisions." Yet, in the first round 35.5% of voters selected a candidate other than Kuchma or Symonenko.[43] Rather than reflecting "confusion," this vote distribution is likely to more accurately reflect voters' sincere preferences. Thus, O'Loughlin's analysis of the second round may conflate turnout of Kuchma supporters with Symonenko opponents as overall support for Kuchma. Voters whose first preferences failed in the first round must choose between not participating in the second round or voting for whichever remaining candidate is the higher preference.

To capture voter preferences and divisions in Ukraine, it is more useful to assess both rounds of competition.

In both models of round 1 and round 2 outcomes, the dependent variable is Kuchma's performance at the district level. In addition to region, we control for other possible influences on support. First, we suspect that Kuchma will be more successful in districts where leftist parties are less popular. We include the variable LEFT98, which represents the local-level performance of parties of the left in 1998.[44] This is a control for district-level popularity that might explain some of the variance that we would otherwise attribute to region. We also control for districts with large metropolitan areas, based on information from the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission.[45]

The results of the OLS analysis are presented in Table 7. In both rounds, the coefficients for LEFT98 are statistically significant and negative in sign. As anticipated, Kuchma's local-level support is lower in districts where leftist parties performed better in the previous parliamentary election. The coefficient for urban areas does not exhibit a consistent pattern in terms of statistical significance. It is, however, negative in sign when statistically significant, indicating that Kuchma performed better in districts without a major metropolitan area.

Some coefficients for regional variables are significant in all models, even in the presence of controls.[46] Kuchma performs best in the west in all models. In the eight-region model, we can distinguish his support among different regions of the west, with his strongest support in the "true" west, followed by the southwest.[47] The coefficient for west-central is not significantly different from the south. We also find differences in regional support between rounds 1 and 2. In round 1, the coefficients for the east region are significant in the four-region and eight-region models. The coefficients for the central region and north-central regions are also significant in the four-region and eight-region models, respectively. This outcome suggests that variation in the choice set between rounds 1 and 2 may affect the support base for Kuchma and calls into question the conclusion that round 2 results are more representative of voter preferences than round 1 results.

The analysis based on election results suggests that regional factors exert an independent effect when we control for other possible explanations. With parliamentary elections, we controlled for electoral effects (placement and incumbency) and the interaction between region and electoral effects. Region influenced outcomes in predictable ways for the KPU and Rukh. In presidential elections, region also affected support for Kuchma, even when controls were added for local popularity of leftist parties and the presence of urban centers. Moreover, regional effects varied between rounds 1 and 2 when the choice set changed for voters.

Conclusion

In this article, we have argued that—contrary to the claims of O'Loughlin (2001) but consistent with the claims of other scholars—regions in Ukraine matter. To demon-

TABLE 7
Kuchma performance in 1999 (OLS estimates with robust standard errors)

	Round 1			Round 2		
	2 regions	4 regions	8 regions	2 regions	4 regions	8 regions
Constant	69.214**	56.549***	57.983**	94.987**	73.714***	78.934**
Left98	−0.715***	−0.430***	−0.450***	−0.858***	−0.542***	−0.616***
Urban	−4.873***	−1.322	−1.764	−2.878*	1.036	0.280
East	−1.725			−5.024***		
Central		−7.144**			0.126	
East		−3.261**			1.411	
West		13.633***			22.763***	
East			−4.023*			0.731
East-central			−3.283			−1.111
Krym			−0.999			−4.508*
North-central			−6.854**			−0.513
Southwest			8.408***			15.763**
West			17.338***			21.585***
West-central			−4.258			2.713
Adjusted R^2	0.653	0.787	0.781	0.734	0.835	0.806
MSE	8.75	6.90	7.05	9.24	7.31	8.00
N	225	225	225	225	225	225

Note: West is the excluded region for the two-region model. South is the excluded region for the four- and eight-region models.

**$p \leq 0.01$; *$p \leq 0.05$.

strate this, we do not need to show that a regional effect is consistent in magnitude and direction across all questions at all times. Rather, we need to show that, for key questions, regional effects seem to be of great consequence, even when we control for other possible explanatory variables.[48] The statistical analysis supports the view that regional effects are not simply compositional; they represent important underlying political cultural divisions in the people of Ukraine. In addition, the results indicate that intra-regional variation is not so great as to weaken the impact of where one lives on both attitudes and political behavior.

But it clearly makes a difference where one draws the regional boundaries in Ukraine. It is quite possible that those who have underestimated regional divisions, when compared with linguistic and ethnic divides in the country, have done so because the regional arrangements they were considering forced the oblasts of Ukraine into too few (and too large) regions. While we agree with the position of O'Loughlin (2001) that too much variation within regions weakens their explanatory value, we do not accept the idea that the solution of this problem is to abandon regional analysis in countries like Ukraine. Instead, for historical, economic and demographic reasons, reinforced by the results of several statistical analyses in this study, we suggest that scholars consider breaking Ukraine into more regions than are typically found in the literature on political attitudes and behavior. Estimation of the eight-region model reduces the intra-regional variation problem that O'Loughlin highlights. The eight-region model also underscores that regional divisions in Ukraine are not as simple as an "east versus west" divide—or even a continuum from west to east. Certain regions of the country (the southwest and Krym, for example) differ greatly not only from each other but also from regions next to them. The estimation of models of views of the "ethnic other," support for the political system and regime, and voting behavior in Ukraine indicate that the southwest is quite different from the neighboring oblasts in the heart of the west, while Krym is markedly distinct from its neighbors in the rest of the south.

We acknowledge that the lines dividing the regions from one another are not as distinct as they were portrayed in either the discussion of the regions early in the paper or in their use in the statistical analyses. Like any regional political cultures, the political cultures in Ukraine blur around the edges. As a result, while the regions examined in the statistical analysis appeared sharply divided, what happens around the boundaries of the regions of Ukraine is a question that demands further study.

The analyses in this article have centered on Ukraine. We do not assume that scholars studying other European or Eurasian states would get similar results if they divided up their states of interest into a greater number of regions than is the norm in the existing literature on those countries. But the findings in this study should certainly make such scholars consider the dangers of ignoring intra-state regional variation in studies of mass attitudes and political behavior. They also warn against the assumption that any such regional variation is the result of compositional effects. Finally, these results caution scholars not to make the regional divisions in their

analyses too simplistic (east *vs*. west, north *vs*. south, *etc*.). When there are solid historical, economic and demographic arguments for dividing the country into many regions, it is valuable to examine such a multi-region framework. One can always collapse these smaller and more numerous regions into fewer and larger ones. But, as the results of this study indicate, starting with a small number of large regions can lead researchers to mis-state geographic differences and overestimate the effects of other variables.

Appendix: The Coding of Variables in the Statistical Analysis of Survey Data

The variables used in the regression estimations of the mass attitudes are based on data from the November 1998 Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) Ukraine Omnibus Survey. More than 100 interviewers conducted over 1,600 interviews from 2 to 12 November 1998. The surveys were conducted in all oblasts of Ukraine, in 70 cities and 43 villages. The response rate was 78%. The sample is representative both of Ukraine as a whole and within the various regions of the country. The sampling process included a random selection of cities and rural areas, using population points. Within the selected population points, postal units were then randomly selected, followed by the random selection of streets, buildings and apartments within the postal districts. Finally, there was a random selection of the respondents from the adults in the household.

The coding scheme for the stereotype scale is listed below. For the coding of the regions, see Table 1. The coding for all other variables analyzed in the models presented in Tables 2–4 can be found in Barrington (2002). The stereotype scale was an additive scale, summing a given respondent's respective coded answers to the following questions:

Question p64: "Now I will name for you some qualities that are to some degree characteristic of people of all nationalities. Of all these qualities, tell me which are characteristic of Ukrainians/Russians and which are not … kindness?" Characteristic = 1; not characteristic = − 1; difficult to say = 0; other, refused, N/A = missing.

Question p66: "Now I will name for you some qualities that are to some degree characteristic of people of all nationalities. Of all these qualities, tell me which are characteristic of Ukrainians/Russians and which are not … cleanliness?" Characteristic = 1; not characteristic = − 1; difficult to say = 0; other, refused, N/A = missing.

Question p69: "Now I will name for you some qualities that are to some degree characteristic of people of all nationalities. Of all these qualities, tell me which are characteristic of Ukrainians/Russians and which are not … honesty?" Characteristic = 1; not characteristic = − 1; difficult to say = 0; other, refused, N/A = missing.

Question p68: "Now I will name for you some qualities that are to some degree characteristic of people of all nationalities. Of all these qualities, tell me which are characteristic of Ukrainians/Russians and which are not … diligent?" Characteristic = 1; not characteristic = − 1; difficult to say = 0; other, refused, N/A = missing.

Question p67: "Now I will name for you some qualities that are to some degree characteristic of people of all nationalities. Of all these qualities, tell me which are characteristic of Ukrainians/Russians and which are not … laziness?" Characteristic = -1; not characteristic = 1; difficult to say = 0; other, refused, N/A = missing.

NOTES

1. He would probably add to this list a third point that he makes repeatedly in the paper: that the strength of the regional effect varies by the nature of the issue in question. We would concede this point to an extent; after all, the Southern culture in the United States will be reflected more strongly in certain issues than on others. But we also demonstrate strong regional effects across different kinds of social and political attitudes and political behaviors.
2. In one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) estimations, in-group variation is often larger than between-group variation; this fact alone does not invalidate the estimation of between-group differences (such as between regions), although it would tend to indicate a fair amount of noise in the model. Our thanks to John McAdams for bringing this point to our attention.
3. Katchanovski (2001) employs the east Ukraine versus west Ukraine approach, although he includes more oblasts in the east than we do in our two-region models below. In a study of voting behavior, Roper and Fesnic (2003) also present a two-region approach, concentrating their analysis on differences between Galicia and the rest of the country. See also Zimmerman (1998) for a three-region approach.
4. The best discussion of these various features across Ukraine can be found in Birch (2000). While she ultimately chooses to examine five regions, her discussion of history and economic development is consistent in many ways with the eight-region approach we examine in this study.
5. Barrington (*e.g.* 2002; 1997) has employed a nine-region framework in studies of mass attitudes in Ukraine.
6. Of the 1,606 respondents 249 came from the east region.
7. Both of these oblasts are well above the national average for population density, with Donetsk being the most densely populated oblast in the country.
8. Arel (1992) also points out that the two oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk were treated as a separate "land" in proposals floated for a federal system in Ukraine in 1991.
9. Two hundred eighty of the respondents to the survey are from the east-central region.
10. After Donetsk; see Hesli, 1995, Table 2.
11. Three hundred seventy-three of the survey respondents are from the north-central region.
12. Arel (1992) also mentions that these three oblasts were considered a single region (or "land") in one of the federalization plans floated in 1992, and they form one region discussed by Melnyk (1992). One hundred forty-four of the survey respondents are from the south region.
13. While the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces are over 40% Russian, the percentage is less than half that in Kherson and Mikolaiv (Solchanyk, 1994). But, as Stebelsky (1997) points out, *non-Soviet* Russian place names are more common in the south than in most of the east. Melvin (1995) argues that for historical reasons ethnic relations between the Ukrainians and Russians in the south were also less polarized than in other parts of the country.
14. Krym is often included in the south. Seventy-three of the survey respondents in our analysis are from Krym.

15. While support in all other oblasts was over 80%, in Krym only 54% supported independence.
16. The west-central region includes 238 of the survey respondents.
17. Volyn and Rivne were re-annexed into Poland from 1919 to 1939 (Arel, 1992).
18. Seventy-two of the survey respondents are from the southwest region.
19. Zakarpatia was controlled by Hungary for 500 years and then was briefly part of Czechoslovakia; Chernivtsi was under Austro-Hungarian rule from the 1700s until World War I and then under the control of Romania until World War II (Arel, 1992).
20. The west has 177 of the survey respondents.
21. The survey was the November 1998 Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) National Omnibus Survey. There were 1,606 respondents. Additional details about the survey can be found in the Appendix.
22. The variables examined in the statistical analyses of the survey data are all demographic factors. We have chosen to focus on demographic factors alone rather than mixing together demographic and attitudinal variables. This is in part because of the difficulties of analyzing demographic and attitudinal variables through estimating single-equation OLS models (see Barrington and Herron, 2001). But it makes particular sense in this case, since the variation we are primarily concerned with—region—is a demographic variable. While some attitudinal variables may play a role in shaping views of the ethnic other, we assume in this study that they fall at a later stage of the causal process and are themselves affected by the demographic variables. As such, our demographic-only model is a reduced form equation of a larger causal structure.
23. Those who would expect proximity to lead to hostile views of the ethnic other emphasize the importance of contact in feeding negative stereotypes and concerns. Those who see proximity as a factor in positive stereotyping stress that the more familiar one is with members of the ethnic other, the more difficult it becomes to hold stereotypes. But existing studies (*e.g.* Ray, 1983) indicate this is not the case with low-level, informal contact.
24. Demographers would probably not agree with this label. While acknowledging that the variables include a wide-ranging set of socioeconomic and demographic features, we use "demographic" to capture the difference between the variables analyzed in this section and attitudinal variables commonly included in statistical analyses of mass attitudes.
25. Bremmer (1994) points out something often overlooked as a part of this cross-cutting cleavage, that Russians in the far west of Ukraine have a high (self-reported) level of ability in the Ukrainian language.
26. Table 2 also includes "model fit" statistics. While one should generally not put great stock on R^2 as an indication of whether or not a particular model is appropriate (see King, 1986), the use of the statistic as a way to compare alternative models of effects on the same dependent variable using the same sample is appropriate. In this case, the R^2 statistic—and, more important, the adjusted R^2 statistic, which takes into account the number of variables in the model—increases as one moves from the two-region to the four-region to the eight-region model. In the traditional, though not completely proper, way of interpreting R^2, one could say that a "greater portion of the variance" of the dependent variable is explained by the eight-region model than by the alternative models. Note also that the standard error (SE) and F statistic for the equations also decrease as one moves from the two-region to the four-region to the eight-region model. These are, again, signs of improved model fit.
27. In an earlier version of this article, we were criticized by reviewers for excluding the west region in the four- and eight-region analyses. While the pattern of which region is more

or less likely to see the ethnic other in positive terms is the same regardless of which region would be excluded, we have excluded the south from these analyses in this version of the article.

28. And generally much larger size of the coefficients compared with those of the other dummy variable terms.

29. The model fit statistics in the eight-region model also again support its use over the others, with adjusted R^2 and standard errors all indicating the better model fit of the four-region model over the two-region model and of the eight-region model over the four-region model.

30. The importance of the coefficient was another story. The 0.066 coefficient on the age variable in the eight-region model, for example, means that a respondent 25 years older than another would support the government only 1.65 more on the support scale. Compare this with the difference from speaking Russian, living in a large cities or living in almost any of the regions other than the west.

31. Again, the west region was excluded in the two-region model, while the south serves as the comparison region in the four- and eight-region models.

32. This effect has been demonstrated in other mixed electoral systems (Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Herron and Nishikawa, 2001).

33. We focus on these measures of electoral effects because they vary at the district level. Data were not available at the district level for other variables that we considered including in the model.

34. Because the dependent variable cannot take on values less than 0 or greater than 100, we also conducted a tobit analysis for each model of parliamentary and presidential elections. The results of the OLS and tobit analyses were virtually identical in each case, so we report the OLS results here.

35. When the four-region model is tested using tobit, SMD is significant at the 0.05 level.

36. Overall model performance improves across the regional definitions; the eight-region model provides a better fit than the two- or four-region approach and facilitates a more nuanced interpretation of regional effect. The coefficient for Krym is significant at the 0.10 level in the eight-region model. The interactive term is dropped because the KPU fielded candidates in all districts in the region. In addition the interactive term for the southwest is significant at the 0.10 level.

37. Counter-intuitively, KPU performance seems to be negatively affected by candidate placement in the eastern and western districts. The former is due, in part, to limited variation in nomination patterns in the east; the KPU placed candidates in all but four of the 35 districts in the east region.

38. It is possible that multicollinearity introduced by the interactive terms has caused Type II error—failure to reject the null when it should be rejected. Nevertheless, we find that the interaction between region and candidate placement is significant in at least some cases. This suggests that region exerts both a direct effect on performance and an indirect effect through candidate placement. For more on interactive terms, see Friedrich (1982).

39. The interactive term for southwest was excluded in the eight region analysis because Rukh nominated candidates in every district in that region.

40. SMD placement does not present an independent effect in part because there is limited variation on the variable; Rukh ran candidates in most district races.

41. The coefficients for east and east-central are negative, but east-central is significant only at the 0.10 level.

42. Higher levels of turnout among pro-Kuchma voters in certain regions could also reflect ballot box stuffing (Herron and Johnson, 2003).

43. Data available at the Central Electoral Commission website (< http://195.230.157.53/pls/vp1/webproc0 >).
44. The left includes the KPU, Agrarian Party of Ukraine, Progressive Socialist Party and Socialist/Peasant Bloc.
45. As in our analysis of parliamentary results, we focus on variables that vary at the district level.
46. The overall model fit is lower with the eight-region model than the four-region model; an increase in the number of regions permits a more detailed interpretation of regional effects, but the overall model is better predicted with fewer macro-regions.
47. In the eight-region model of round 1, the coefficients for east-central and west-central are significant at the 0.10 level, reinforcing variation in western support as well as Kuchma's relatively weak eastern support.
48. In fact, we might find substantial heterogeneity within and across regions, depending on the question that is asked. Does this mean that the regional effect is bogus? Not necessarily. Interests across regions can intersect on certain questions but not on others. Scholars of U.S. politics consider the South to be an important region and sometimes control for regional effects in their analyses of political attitudes and behavior. But, while the South may be different than some regions on some questions (*i.e.* abortion or prayer in schools), it may be indistinguishable from other regions on other questions. Our findings in Ukraine suggest that regional differences matter, but the nature of the question influences how regions matter.

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